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From Cradle to Grave?: Policy Responses to Death 
 
 
Abstract 
While death features widely in various humanities and some social science disciplines, to date 
it has not been given the attention it deserves in social policy discourse or research. This paper 
sets out to begin to rectify that omission. Outlining a range of policy areas affected by death, it 
argues that budget and outcome-driven priorities in the UK have resulted in the evolution of 
disconnected and inconsistent policy responses to death. The paper begins by outlining death 
rates and characteristics of population ageing before focussing on social divisions in death and 
associated policies. It considers the death and UK social policy agenda before outlining the key 
characteristics involved in developing a coherent policy response and policy analysis in this 
field. It argues for a more comprehensive, consistent and joined up policy response to death, 
and corresponding academic study of death, which acknowledges and supports individuals 
preparing to die, when they die, and those left behind.  
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Introduction 
Death and taxes are the only certainties in life ± an aphorism commonly associated with 
Benjamin Franklin in 1789 (but coined by Daniel Defoe five decades earlier). For such an 
inevitability it is remarkable that death has been long neglected by social policy makers and 
policy analysts alike. This paper examines why this has been the case, specifically in the 
context of the UK where the establishment of the welfare state was clearly demarked as being 
µIURPWKHFUDGOHWRWKHJUDYH¶1. Through doing so the paper demonstrates that death presents 
the opportunity to bring together a sizable range of policy areas which are not usually 
considered together (Drakeford, 1998; Rowlingson, 2006; blinded for review).  
 
At the outset it is important to note that policy responses to death are not just about dying, the 
moment of death, and bereavement. It is evident that iQGLYLGXDOV¶H[SHULHQFHVRIGHDWKDQGWKH
VLWXDWLRQRIWKRVHµOHIWEHKLQG¶are the products of decisions made across the life course and 
the impact of policies on these decisions. For instance, age at the point of death is connected to 
ZLGHUVRFLDOSROLFLHVZKLFKDIIHFWKHDOWKHPSOR\PHQWLQFRPHSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGLQGLYLGXDOV¶
overall quality of life. Death can also be linked to various characteristics such as social class 
(Marmot, 2010), gender (Austad, 2006) and ethnicity (Holloway, 2007), all of which shape and 
FRQWH[WXDOLVHSHRSOH¶VOLYHV before they die.  
 
Moreover, historical policy developments play a role in shaping communities¶ and individuals¶ 
experiences of death. These have an impact on the resources and quality of services available 
to dying individuals and those close to them, as well as on measures to prevent death (Monroe 
et al., 2011). In turn, these are shaped by the prevailing political ideology at any particular time. 
In policy terms, the prevailing political ideology has implications for how rights and 
responsibilities are conceptualised and operationalised; responses to times of crisis (including 
austerity measures); and the extent to which (financial) support is provided by the state or the 
market, or indeed whether it is provided at all. For instance, governments in the UK the last 
few decades have been dominated by neoliberal ideologies, which have promoted the role of 
markets in providing for individual needs, challenging whether the state should provide welfare 
                                                          
1 This was established in the 1942 Beveridge Report that became the basis for the establishment of the welfare 
state in the UK in the mid 1940s. The Report lauded the creation of an extensive system of social insurance 
ƚŚĂƚƌĞĂĐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵ ?ƚŚĞĐƌĂĚůĞƚŽŐƌĂǀĞ ?. 
above a minimum level (blinded for review). As a result, policy not only affects the way people 
near the end of life are supported but also the financial circumstances of those left behind 
through factors such as Social Fund Funeral Expenses Payments and inheritance tax.  
 
In short, policy is closely involved and intertwined in how death is experienced and our 
understanding(s) of death in the modern world. Given this, it is surprising that death is routinely 
overlooked within policy debates and literature in the UK and beyond (blinded for review). 
While any conventional social policy book for undergraduates will cover a range of issues 
associated with crime, health, poverty and welfare, it is rare that the death is acknowledged or 
explicitly mentioned beyond mortality rates.  Certainly, mainstream social policy analysis has 
continued to neglect death beyond health policy specifically focused on palliative care/end of 
life care. As a result, the policy analysis of death has lagged behind other disciplines. For 
instance, within sociological inquiries there has been an increasing emphasis on attempting to 
examine the norms and social structures that aid in defining and managing dying and the 
consequences of death (Riley, 1983; Hunt, 2017), while in gerontology literature the dying 
process, end of life care, spirituality and bereavement have all been considered (Dickenson et 
al., 2000). Epidemiology has also explored death in relation to health-related factors and 
longevity (Marmot, 2010).   
 
It is within this context that this paper seeks to identify the limited (and overwhelmingly end 
of life care focused) discussions on death within social policy, and to make the case for a 
consolidated and consistent policy response to death, dying and bereavement. If this is to 
happen then policy requires a holistic account of death ± as presented here - in order to make a 
convincing case for death to be allocated a higher priority by policy makers. Such an account 
requires an acknowledgement of the role of the life course in our understanding of death. This 
need for such focus is enhanced by the ageing of the global population and projected increases 
in death rates meaning that the challenges for policy responses to death are likely to intensify 
and expand over the next 20 years.  
 
Focused on the UK specifically, the paper begins with a very brief overview of the 
characteristics of population ageing before moving on to consider death rates, social divisions 
in death and associated policies. It discusses the death and social policy agenda before 
preparing the ground for the development of policy responses to, and policy analysis of, death. 
 
 
Population ageing and death rates 
 
Ageing 
As with almost every country around the world, the UK population is ageing. In 2015 of the 
65.1million UK population 11.6million (17.8 per cent) were aged 65 years and over. This 
proportion has increased between 1975 and 2015, from 14.1 per cent of the population to 17.8 
per cent (ONS, 2017). At age 65, women can on average expect to live another 20.9 years and 
men 18.5 years (ONS, 2016a). Often referred to as the µGolden Cohort¶, people aged in their 
70s and 80s have seen the most improvements in mortality over the course of their lifetime 
(ONS, 2017). By 2015, there were estimated to be over half a million people aged 90 years or 
over. This represents a rise of 73 per cent over the last decade (ONS, 2016b). In the same year 
there were 14,570 people aged 100 years or older. This ageing of the population, and 
SDUWLFXODUO\WKHJURZWKLQµWKHROGHVWROG¶VKRZVQRVLJn of slowing down. ONS projections 
indicate that of all those babies born in 2013, a third can expect to live to their 100th birthday 
and beyond (ONS, 2013). 
 Death rates 
One reason for the ageing of the population is the decline in the number of deaths per year as 
individuals benefit from enhanced diet, sanitation and medical treatment over the course of 
their lifetime. The number of deaths in the UK has fallen steadily since 2003, reaching a low 
in 2009 with 553,400 deaths. More recently there has been a slight rise again ± to 603,000 
deaths in 2015 ± mostly because the number of deaths is affected by the increasing size of the 
population (ONS, 2017). Moreover we know that the death rate is due to rise: the ONS (2015c) 
has predicted that between 2014 and 2024 there will be almost 200,000 more deaths per year.  
 
A rise in the number of deaths is directly related to an increase in the numbers of people dying 
at older ages due to the growth of the older population (ONS, 2017). Indeed, in England and 
Wales in 19632, deaths were highest for males aged 70 to 74 years (15 per cent of all male 
deaths) whereas deaths were highest for females at ages 80 to 84 and 85 and over (each with 
18 per cent of all female deaths). In the UK in 2013±2015, the majority of all deaths fell in the 
80 and over age group, accounting for 57.4% of deaths for men and 68.8% for women in 2013±
2015 (ONS, 2016a).The most common age at death in the UK in 2013̢2015 was 85 for men 
and 89 for women (ONS, 2016b).  
 
These demographic changes are not unique to the UK; such trends have also been witnessed 
across the western world where, according to global predictions, 91 million people will die in 
2050 compared with 56 million in 2009 (Gomes et al., 2011). It is projected that (XURSH¶V 
population aged over 65 will rise over the next 50 years, with three times as many people aged 
80 years and over in 2060 as in 2010 (Eurostat, 2014). Furthermore, it is predicted that from 
                                                          
2 UK data on death was not available until over a decade later. 
2015 the number of deaths across Europe will start to outnumber the number of births (Eurostat, 
2014).  
 
Given that death is primarily associated with later life, there exists a risk that discussing policy 
responses may over-emphasize the false but still prevalent notion that old age is associated 
with continuous loss and decline ± which has been termed the µburden of dependency¶ thesis 
(blinded for review). Indeed, the social construction of later life dependency may be an 
influential factor in the neglect of death by policy makers and policy analysts, by portraying it 
as the inevitable result of decrescence. However, while the evidence overwhelmingly refutes 
this thesis (Townsend, 2007) and also demonstrates the major formal and informal roles older 
people play within society (Lain, 2016), it is the case that older people are more likely to 
experience co-morbidities and their illness trajectories are more likely to fluctuate than those 
of younger adults. They are also less likely than younger people to have access to wide(r) social 
networks, with fewer links within and beyond the local community (Thomas, 2015). They are 
also less likely to die in a place of their choosing (Seymour et al., 2005) as µvery few people 
now live their lives to the end, in their own homes, without any recourse to formal health and 
VRFLDOFDUHVHUYLFHV¶+ROORZD\For the majority of those dying in older age various 
service providers are involved in their lives and the lives of their families, and often intensively 
(Brown and Walter, 2014). Therefore, the way in which health and social care policy responses 
and services are structured and delivered can have profound effects on the experiences of death 
and bereavement for older people, their families and their friends. 
 
Deaths before older age 
At the same time it is important to not overlook deaths that occur before people reach older 
age. While increasing mortality rates are largely a result of an ageing population, it is also the 
case WKDWGHDWKPD\EHµXQWLPHO\¶µ3UHPDWXUH¶PRUWDOLW\LQWKHIRUPRIGHDWKVEHWZHHQWKH
ages of 16 and 64, account for 16 per cent of deaths, with deaths in childhood accounting for 1 
per cent in England and Wales (Victor, 2010). These deaths may be as a result of accident or 
injury, euthanasia or suicide, and not related to older age (Richards et al., 2013). The death may 
DOVREHFRQVLGHUHGµXQWLPHO\¶DVDUHVXOWRIULVNWDNLQJEHKDYLRXUVVXFKDVGUXJRUDOFRKROuse 
(Valentine and Walter, 2015). As such, policy in relation to death should not exclusively focus 
on the needs of the oldest proportion of the population; it needs to include services that may be 
accessed as a result of unexpected, abusive, or violent deaths.  
 
The Social Division of Death 
Crucially, death is not experienced equally. It does not exist in a social, economic or political 
vacuum: it mirrors life, who we are and how we are able to live. Therefore, like life, death is 
characterised by one of the long-standing preoccupations of politicians and policy analysts 
alike: inequality. An example of this can be found in life expectancy: for example in England 
and Wales while average life expectancy has risen among all socio-economic groups, the 
disparities between these groups have actually widened. In 1982-86, life expectancy at birth 
for women who were employed in routine manual occupations was 77 years; Table 1 shows 
that by 2007-11 it had risen to 80.4 years (ONS, 2015a). While such trends are to be celebrated 
the equivalent figures for higher managerial/professional groups were 81 years and 84.5 years 
respectively, indicating significant variation in longevity according to occupational status. For 
men, life expectancy at birth for those taking up routine manual occupations rose from 70.5 
years (1982-86) to 76.6 years (2007-11), while for those in higher managerial/professional 
occupations it increased from 75.5 years to 82.5 years respectively (ONS, 2015a). There is thus 
a remarkable 4.1 years for women and 5.9 years for men difference in their expected ages of 
death between those at the top and bottom of the occupational hierarchy. These occupational 
differences are further replicated at age 65 for men and women. Table 1 indicates that the life 
expectancy of men and women at age 65 who had worked in routine manual occupations were 
3.9 years and 3.1 years less (respectively) than those in higher managerial/professional 
occupations. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
It is not only life expectancy that reflects the divided nature of UK society but also healthy life 
expectancy. In England, healthy life expectancy (defined by the World Health Organisation 
(ndDV WKHQXPEHURI\HDUVDSHUVRQFDQH[SHFW WR OLYH LQ µIXOOKHDOWK¶ZKHUH WKH\DUHQRW
suffering from a disease or injury) at birth for women in social class V (manual) in 2001-3 was 
68.5 years and 64 years for men in the same class. Compared with those in social class I 
(professional/managerial), where the figures were 80 years and 77 years respectively, this 
equates to a stark difference of 11.5 years for women and 13 years for men between the top 
and bottom social classes (ONS, 2010). Furthermore, healthy life expectancy at age 65 for 
women and men in social class V (manual) in 2001-3 were 13.5 years and 9.8 years 
respectively. Once again, there are considerable differences when compared with those in 
social class I (professional/managerial) where the figures were 19.5 years and 16.2 years 
respectively (ONS, 2010). This indicates that not only do those in the lowest social class die 
prematurely in comparison with those in higher classes but, also, their deaths are likely to be 
preceded by much longer than average periods of ill-health and/or chronic disability. Needless 
to say (almost all of) these expectations regarding longevity and healthy life will have a 
significant bearing on how the final event itself is approached and experienced.  
 
$VZHOODVLQHTXDOLW\EHLQJUHIOHFWHGVWDUNO\LQWKHSDWKZD\WRGHDWK¶VGRRUDQGWKHSDVVDJH
through it, what is left behind at the LQGLYLGXDO¶V journey end is a product of unequal socio-
economic status. Unequal lives result in wide disparities in bequests: one half of the UK 
population currently leaves nothing of any financial value when they die, with one in twenty 
leaving more than £500,000 (Rowlingson, 2016). In other words, the majority of people have 
nothing to fear from inheritance taxes (which currently begin at around £300,000), but there is 
almost universal abhorrence of their very idea (Rowlingson and McKay, 2005). This apparently 
GHHSO\LQJUDLQHGGLVOLNHRIWD[HVRQLQKHULWDQFHRUµGHDWKWD[HV¶DVWKH tabloids call them at 
election times, represents a fundamental barrier to the creation of a more equal society, or even 
a less unequal one, where financial inequalities continue to widen through cycles of deprivation 
and affluence (Rowlingson and Connor, 2011).  
 
Death and austerity policies 
In the UK, government austerity policies have had an impact on this social division of death. 
Two major waves of neoliberalism since the 1980s have attacked the welfare state, first because 
it was said to cause economic harm (by µcrowding oXW¶SULYDWHLQYHVWPHQWand, most recently, 
because it is blamed for the financial crisis in 2007/8. In both cases such claims have 
contributed to a political rhetoric which disguises a very simple ideological aversion to public 
provision, except where such provision subsidises corporations and the rich (Titmuss, 1958; 
Farnsworth, 2013). The enduring pain from resulting public expenditure cuts, particularly since 
2010, FRPPRQO\ UHIHUUHG WR LQ VKRUWKDQG DV µDXVWHULW\ PHDVXUHV¶ have caused millions of 
people hardship - including hundreds of thousands who work for poverty level wages ± and 
has been well documented (Bennett, 2014). Moreover, the implementation of such austerity 
measures has represented a major barrier to the development of fairer, more equitable, social 
policies (Farnsworth and Irving, 2015). Research in the USA has shown that economic 
downturns in addition to a lack of generous employment benefits increase levels of suicide, 
especially among young men (Cylus et al., 2014). Austerity politics and reductions in services 
have also had a damaging impact on end of life care and the opportunities for the poorest 
members of society to die with dignity.  
 
The Funeral Expenses Payment 
The generosity of state support in relation to funeral assistance also has implications for how 
death and its aftermath are experienced. The origins of the Funeral Expenses Payment (FEP) 
can be found in the establishment of the UK Welfare State in the late 1940s. In order to provide 
financial assistance for funeral provision a Universal Death Grant was introduced in 1949, set 
at £20 and available to all. In 1987, the then Conservative government withdrew the Grant as 
a way of curbing rising expenditure (Drakeford, 1998), replacing it with a means-tested FEP 
that was a part of the newly established Social Fund. This was, and continues to be, a 
conditional benefit to those eligible, with claims assessed on both the availability of resources, 
familial and close relationships, and the claiPDQW¶V income. IQWURGXFHGWRµWDUJHWEHQHILWVRQ
WKRVH PRVW LQ QHHG WKURXJK D SURFHVV RI µFRQVLGHUHG GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ¶ DQG WR FRQWURO
H[SHQGLWXUHPRUHFDUHIXOO\¶ 6LOEXUQDQG%HFNHU for some time there have been 
concerns about how the FEP operates and the low level of the award (blinded for review). The 
costs associated with the funeral ritual and disposal are now in the region of £3,500 and are 
predicted to rise to between £4,500 and £5,000 up to 2020 (Royal London, 2014; Sunlife, 
2014). Despite these substantial costs, in 2003 a cap of £700 for funeral director fees was 
introduced and has remained ever since, ignoring the Social Security Select Committee (2001) 
recommendation that the FEP cap should be annually reviewed.  
 
As a result, the disparity between the average award and the current cost of a funeral means 
that, even if a claimant is successful, they are likely to face a shortfall. Moreover, the complex 
and invasive procedures that means-testing often entails has the effect of discouraging many 
potential beneficiaries from applying (Gugushvili and Hirsch, 2014). The :RUNDQG3HQVLRQV¶ 
Select Committee Inquiry into Bereavement Benefits (2016) recommended a review of the 
system of funeral payments. The benefit was devolved to Scotland as part of the Scotland Act 
(2016), and will be re-launched as the Funeral Assistance Payment in Scotland in 2019. In 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, regulations are being changed but there is to be no lifting 
of the £700 cap at the time of writing.  
 
In sum, despite the challenges presented by increasing mortality rates and increased life 
expectancy, alongside austerity measures in policy provision, death has remained largely 
absent from the social policy and policy analysis agendas. This has led to the development of 
policy responses in an ad-hoc, department-by-department basis (blinded for review). Such a 
silo approach has further consequences, with budget and outcome-driven priorities resulting in 
the fragmentation of separate tasks associated with dying, death and bereavement, as opposed 
to a focus on the whole person (Holloway, 2007). This has created a µNQRZOHGJHJDS¶DWERWK
an individual and societal levels as to how to handle, manage and prepare for death (blinded 
for review).  
 
This lack of coherence and the way in which policy areas intersect and work together (or not) 
was recognised in the above mentioned Work DQG 3HQVLRQV¶ 6HOHFW &RPPLWWHH¶V Special 
Inquiry into Bereavement Benefits in 2016. It recommended that a holistic and department-
wide review be undertaken of all policy areas associated with death, in order to ensure that the 
most vulnerable people in society have a robust, sustainable and consistent safety net at the end 
of life. This recommendation was rejected by the Government the day before the 2016 UK 
Referendum on EU membership, and perhaps unsurprisingly has failed to gain traction since, 
despite repeated pressure for review (blinded for review). 
 
Death and end of life care 
The one area of policy associated with death which has received consistent policy and academic 
attention is healthcare policy and, more recently, on managing the end of life. Yet despite the 
increase in policy on managing the end of life (blinded for review), there are shortfalls as µLWLV
only recently that the realities of the sheer scale of the increasing numbers and proportion of 
older people in many Western societies has led to a focus on the deficiencies in the end of life 
care of many oIWKHP¶0RQURHHWDO5). Georghiou and Bardsley (2014) estimate that 
hospital costs in the final 90 days of life represent some of the largest cost elements in 
healthcare, averaging over £4,500 per person. The bulk of this cost is due to emergency hospital 
admissions, increasing rapidly in the last few weeks of life. Other potential costs include local 
authority funded social care, visits to the GP and seeing a community nurse. Within this, 
equitable access to end of life care remains a perennial issue, with the Health Select Committee 
report on 'HSDUWPHQW RI +HDOWK¶V (QG RI /LIH &DUH 6WUDWHJ\ (DoH, 2015) citing a need to 
improve access to services for people with a non-cancer diagnosis, older people and individuals 
with dementia in particular. 
 
Nearly a decade ago, seeking to address some of these deficiencies, and originating from over 
\HDUV¶ZRUWKRIGHYHORSPHQWVLQSDOOLDWLYHDQGHQGRIOLIHFDUHWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI+HDOWK¶V
End of Life Care Strategy (EOLCS) (2008) represented a milestone in aiming for consistent 
end of life care treatment across the UK. Such changes at a national level marked a radical 
departure from localised, often hospice-led, provision for end of life care (Reith and Payne, 
2009) and was part of a positive recognition of the need to formalise holistic end of life care 
services within contemporary healthcare provision. These changes in approach to supporting 
people at the end of their lives have been transformative and ongoing (see for example Public 
Health England, 2013); however, it has resulted in the majority of policy and corresponding 
academic analytical work focusing on end of life care. 
 
Moreover, a more holistic approach to healthcare at the end of life alone has not been problem-
free; deficiencies in end of life care are still apparent in the application of the EOLCS (2008), 
which has, at times, failed to live up to expectations. For instance, whilst it was largely greeted 
as providing a positive vision for the future, there have been concerns about the role of choice 
(Randall and Downie, 2010) and how standards and tools ± such as the Liverpool Care Pathway 
± have been implemented. There are concerns about whether it will remain on the policy agenda 
(Ellis et al, 2016), not least because end of life care is under considerable strain as a direct 
result of recent public spending cuts made in the name of austerity. Moreover, the four nations 
within the UK are now embarking on their own end of life care strategies, with Scotland leading 
the way in creating targets for accessible-for-all palliative care by 2021 (blinded for review). 
 
Technology and preparation at the end of life 
The Dying Matters Coalition argues that a societal taboo surrounds death, resulting in many 
people QRW H[SHULHQFLQJ D µJRRGGHDWK¶ or suffering complicated grief (see Seymour et al., 
2010). Given the significance of the medical profession at the end of life the idea of a good 
death may be at odds with some doctors who YLHZµGHDWKDVDIDLOXUH¶ of healthcare (Richards 
2008). At the same time, technological developments that diminish the impact(s) of reaching 
old age mean that there has been a growing belief that we are able to control what happens as 
individuals near the end of their lives: 
 6RFLHW\¶VHYHULQFUHDVLQJ preoccupation with developing technologies to eradicate the 
effects of ageing, coupled with the omnipresent hope of mastery over death itself, 
encourages us all to view ageing, and by extension dying, as a phenomenon we have 
the potential to control (Gott and Ingleton, 2011: XVI).  
 
One outcome of a growing reliance on technology to extend life is that the process and 
experience of dying in contemporary societies is further removed from everyday experiences 
and taken into specialist institutions (hospitals or nursing homes) to be supervised by 
professional personnel and managed by appropriate technologies (Hunt, 2017). Such 
technologies DUH QRW H[FOXVLYHO\ µKLJK WHFK¶ LQWHUYentions and can include antibiotics, and 
assisted support for receiving nutrition and addressing breathing difficulties. 
 
Thus the advance of medicine does not always represent inevitable progress and may actually 
promote a disengagement with death. The enormous advances in healthcare over the last 50 
years have led to many of the challenges that affect people at the end of life arising from a 
failure to fit neatly into a way of framing and organising dying. Rather, people often die 
unpredictably and without any planning for the process (Samsi and Manthorpe, 2011). The 
unpredictability of death can mean that preparation for it is compromised. Using British Social 
Attitudes Survey data from 2009 and 2012, Shucksmith et al. (2012) found that less than a third 
of people had discussed any end of life plans (Table 2). Only 5 per cent had a living will or 
advance care plan and 11 per cent had written plans in place for their funeral (see also Public 
Health England, 2013). This lack of preparation was despite 70 per cent of respondents saying 
they felt comfortable talking about death, with the main reason given for not discussing end of 
life plans the idea that death was a long way off (43 per cent).  
 Insert Table 2 
 
While death may seem like a long way off for some, it is not for others. Table 2 shows the 
likelihood of making plans does rise with age (45 per cent of 75+ year olds in 2012 compared 
with 23 per cent of those aged 18-34 had discussed end of life issues). There remains however 
a significant proportion of people aged 75 or over who have not made plans for the end of their 
life, be they health or financial, serving as another explanation for why policy interest and 
corresponding academic analysis has been lacking ± it is simply not on the radar of many 
people, even those who are coming towards the end of their lives (blinded for review). 
 
 
Towards a social policy of death 
 
Why a Social Policy of Death? 
This paper has so far shown that death has been vastly underrepresented in both official and 
academic policy discourses, with most attention concentrated on end of life care. Yet the impact 
of death is much wider than obviously death-specific policy. Death has implications for the 
workforce, including bereavement leave (Corden and Hirst, 2013), families (Valentine and 
Walter, 2015), financial services, pensions, and the distribution of housing (Rowlingson, 
2016). As noted in this journal, it has further implications for land usage and environmental 
policy in relation to the disposal of remains (blinded for review). How it is approached and 
handled thus reveals much about the values a society espouses and upholds (Department of 
Health, 2008).  
 
In the UK and at a time of austerity and population ageing, the issue of societal values has 
arguably never been more important. At stake is the very meaning of what it constitutes to be 
a citizen and a full member of society. In terms of death and dying,  a fundamental question is 
raised concerning whether an individual should be responsible for their own circumstances at 
the end of life, or whether the state ± and by implication everyone ± has a responsibility to step 
in (blinded for review). For instance, official policies governing inheritance and taxation are 
major drivers of inequality and the µF\FOH RI SULYLOHJH¶ 5RZOLQJVRQ DQG &RQQRU 
whereas financial assistance for funerals through the FEP represents only very minimal 
redistribution based on (stigmatising) means-testing. Moreover, it is difficult to identify values 
when there is a relative dearth of policy responses, for example to the rising cost of cremation 
and burial, both of which contribute to funeral inflation (House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Committee, 2016). Similarly, bereavement provision has habitually not warranted 
much attention by policymakers and policy analysts (Croxall and Hillcoat-Nalletamby, 2007; 
blinded for review) with the literature on the availability of bereavement support tending to be 
restricted to a narrow range of issues such as spousal loss (Corden et al., 2008).  
 
Why then do we need a coherent social policy of death? First and foremost, death throws up µD
complex mesh of issues unique to the individual, yet shaped by prevailing social, political, 
legal, economic, philosophical, religious and cultural imperatives¶+ROORZD\1). Key 
to the case is that death touches the widest possible range of interests: the role of the state; 
national infrastructures; public health and sanitation; the individual in relation to whether they 
planned (and were able to plan for) death; their family, friends and wider networks; services 
provided by the third sector; the role of the commercial sector; policing; land availability; 
environmental policy and so on. This wide impact of death has not been grasped by policy 
makers nor policy analysts, and given the number of people it touches and the implications for 
the state (blinded for review), policy responses and analysis should be needs driven rather than 
purely market driven and, ideally, underpinned by an equality and choice agenda. 
 
What would a coherent social policy of death look like? 
In preparing the ground for a coherent SROLF\RQGHDWKDµJRRGGHDWK¶(itself a contested term) 
LV EHVW DVVXUHG E\ ILUVW RI DOO SURPRWLQJ D µJRRG OLIH¶ :KLOH QRW GLPLQLVKLQJ WKH FULWLFDO
importance of debating precisely what that means in practice and how society may enable or 
prevent it (blinded for review), focus here is specifically on the inequalities that underlie 
premature death. Thus, the first priority of a policy response to death should be to ensure that 
its experience and aftermath are as equally distributed as possible in all but emotional terms. 
This requires a life course perspective and action to prevent premature death and disability.  
 
While the evidence base for such action is very strong, for example with regard to the benefits 
of physical exercise (Marmott, 2010), the main challenge is the sheer scale of what is required 
to seriously reduce inequalities in life expectancy and healthy life expectancy. From the 
eradication of poverty and the promotion of healthy diets, to the transformation of the NHS 
from the treatment of sickness to the promotion of health, without such a programme to reduce 
inequalities death will remain fundamentally unequal.  
 
Second, as noted earlier, it is important to recognise that the impact of death is often 
unpredictable. People have very different needs and experiences and, as such, require different 
levels of support or assistance. However, a lack of coherent policy responses in relation to 
death has resulted in a disjointed range of policies, practices and state provision, where national 
and local government can end up with competing interests. For example, there is limited 
consideration of long-term implications such as providing sustainable cemetery space and a 
nation-wide cash benefit that can adequately absorb the rise in funeral service costs ± which 
are in part driven by local authorities and their increases in cremation and burial fees. Nor is 
there recognition of the impact on carers of terminally ill people; the implications of 
experiencing bereavement in old age; or the vacuum of policy and guidance for public health 
funerals and how the uptake of these is affected by the FEP (blinded for review).  
 
In practice, what this means is that national policy should be clear and coordinated, 
incorporating comprehensible working between various government departments and 
organisations in order to ensure that they operate in an integrated manner. Inter-professional 
and interagency communication, community and family support all need to be incorporated in 
assessments in order to provide a µwhole person approach¶ Brown and Walter, 2014). 
Moreover, public services that are available at the end of life, or to recently bereaved people, 
need to be based on solid and sustainable financial and political foundations that reflect 
population demography and contemporary family structures. This last point is imperative given 
the projected rises in death rates, population growth and the ageing of the population, which 
have the potential to create considerable strain on individuals, families, organisations and the 
state as they try to meet these challenges.  
 
The implications 
Given the policy void in this area, what are the implications IRUVRFLHW\¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQG
handling of death more broadly? One significant consequence is the reinforcement of the 
individualisation and commodification of death. With little policy input the convention has 
become that death, with the exception of end of life care, is a private matter, of little 
consequence to the state. Sociologists and anthropologists have long been arguing this in this 
journal and beyond, but the case has not been taken up by complementary policy analysis. 
While death is often an intensely personal tragedy for the family and friends of the deceased it 
can, as readers of this journal will know, also be an opportunity for public recognition and the 
expression of solidarity amongst the living. Without state intervention, potential financial 
pressures at the time of death can challenge this notion of solidarity (Corden et al., 2008). A 
rise in policy interest in death could therefore embrace consideration of the ways in which the 
personal and the social can be combined, for instance from the national allocation of resources 
and cost control to ensure at least an adequate funeral for everybody, and to enable the 
celebration of individual lives.  
 
A coherent policy response to death should be further characterised by a joined-up approach 
where those individuals coming to the end of their life and those left behind are provided with 
the necessary state endorsed support, which in turn is not stigmatised nor provided in isolation 
from other public funded services. The World Health Organisation (2010) suggests that dying 
needs to be perceived as a µnormal¶OLIHHYHQWDQG process, and a support system offered to help 
dying people and their relatives, making use of available national, local and community 
resources. To enable this, communication between central government departments and clear 
signposting of services and resources associated with death and policy need to be readily 
available. There is potential for this to occur by bringing together existing services: for example 
while the Bereavement Service operated by the Department for Work and Pensions3 provides 
some support, its remit is limited to those receiving social security benefits; at the same time, 
some hospices provide benefit information for dying people and their family but this is ad-hoc 
and dependent on the resources of the hospice itself rather than it being a systemic priority. 
 
                                                          
3 This is a telephone service that assists bereaved relatives in determining whether they are eligible for 
benefits after someone has died. 
Moreover, systems for the administration of state support should be systematically reviewed 
on a regular basis to ensure they operate in an effective manner WKH µKDQJRYHU¶ RI SROLF\
response and the ongoing fragmentation of benefits and services cannot be permitted to 
continue. A principle concern is that where infrastructure associated with death and policy is 
inconsistent, allowed to wither, or if provision is cut, there is a greater likelihood of 
discrimination and inequity emerging between particular groups, relationships and individuals. 
For example, in the newly implemented Bereavement Support Payment, marriage or civil 
partnership are the only grounds on which a widowed spouse can claim for state support 
following a bereavement; co-habiting couples are not considered eligible for the benefit. 
Conversely, cohabitation is recognised as a legitimate relationship in FEP claims. Elsewhere, 
the eradication of derived benefits in the state pension system is likely to adversely affect a 
greater number of women than men given their increased likelihood of having interrupted work 
histories as a result of caring responsibilities and reliance on VSRXVHV¶SHQVLRQV (Price, 2007). 
A reduction in the financial support associated with death is thus likely to magnify inequalities 
and increase reliance on other means-tested benefits such as pension credits.  
 
A more holistic policy approach that brings together disparate policy areas is thus required, one 
which takes into account diverse life course experiences, and contemporary relationship 
patterns. While policies associated with children and childcare, employment and pensions have 
received considerable attention over recent years, those associated with death require a greater 
role on the policy agenda.   
 
Conclusion 
5HIOHFWLQJWKHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQPDGHE\WKH:RUNDQG3HQVLRQV¶6HOHFW&RPPLWWHHIRU
a review of funeral, crematoria and cemetery policy and provision across the UK, clearer policy 
and a more comprehensive infrastructure are required to support the potential growth in the 
number of people requiring state funded support or services, either in preparation for death or 
in response to it. This can be done in a number of ways.  
 
First, a new policy framework for death could start from a life course perspective and 
endeavour to prevent as much inequality as possible in terms of life expectancy and healthy 
life expectancy. Second, the infrastructure around death should be informed by evidence 
generated by policy analysts regarding the most efficient means of provision so that public 
services that are available at the end of life or to recently bereaved people are based on solid 
and sustainable foundations. Third, policy responses must recognise the impact of inequity in 
access to resources and the need for provision which takes into account the diversity in 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶ FLUFXPVWDQFHV and contemporary relationship patterns. These challenges are 
especially important at a time of economic uncertainty where, in addition to ageing populations, 
µevery society has to make complex, rational, yet pragmatic decisions that translate the rhetoric 
of progress and choice and the realities of health economics into appropriate service delivery 
for all groups and communities of the dying¶ (Monroe et al., 2011:  5).  
 
Policies related to death face the twin challenges of increasing financial demands (linked to 
increases in mortality rates) and the pressure to provide services that adequately meet the needs 
of those dying and the people left behind. These need to be delivered with attention to respect 
and dignity. Improving daily living conditions, and tackling an unequal distribution of power 
and resources, all have an impact on longevity and reducing inequalities. At the same time, 
VHUYLFHVIRUG\LQJDQGEHUHDYHGSHRSOHQHHGWRFRQWHQGZLWKWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRISHRSOH¶VOLIH
experiences of poverty and inequality (Payne, 2011). While the life course approach to death 
is critical because it UHFRJQLVHVWKDWGHDWKLVLQIOXHQFHGE\VRFLDOSROLFLHVZKLFKDIIHFWSHRSOHV¶
circumstances throughout their lives, there is also an urgent need to deal with the challenges of 
those dying and those left behind. As this paper has shown, the universal nature of death and 
the aspiration of cradle to grave welfare in the UK mean that it should be central to social 
policy.  
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7DEOH/LIHH[SHFWDQF\DWELUWKDQGDWDJHGE\166(&FODVVWRLQ(QJODQG
DQG:DOHV 
 
Class Class Label Life expectancy 
  at birth at 65 
  Men Women Men Women 
1 Higher Managerial and Professional (HMP) 82.5 84.5 20.3 22.5 
2 Lower Managerial and Professional (LMP) 80.8 84.0 19.3 21.9 
3 Intermediate 80.4 83.4 18.7 21.7 
4 Small Employers Own Account Workers 
(SEOAW) 
80.0 82.8 18.7 21.9 
5 Lower Supervisory and Technical (LST) 78.9 81.2 18.0 20.1 
6 Semi-Routine 77.9 81.2 17.5 20.4 
7 Routine 76.6 80.4 16.4 19.4 
      
6RXUFHONS (2015a) using 216/RQJLWXGLQDO6WXG\ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7DEOHDiscussing end of life issues with someone, by age, 2009 and 2012 
 
  Year 
  2009 2012 
Discussed  % % 
18-34  26 23 
35-44  25 28 
45-54  27 33 
55-64  32 39 
65-74  36 35 
75+  39 45 
All  29 31 
Number  1350 2145 
6RXUFHShucksmith et al. (2012) using BSA Data 
 
 
 
